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1. | Misleading Shareholders Moving the Target: Targets board has acknowledged that Pershing Square has consistently supported Targets executive management team. We have not changed our view. Yet, the board has not acknowledged that Pershing Square holds Targets incumbent directors accountable for the companys underperformance. | |
Does Targets board deny its accountability for the companys strategic missteps in its credit card business and its failure to fully explore strategic alternatives for its real estate assets? Why is the board attempting to mislead shareholders by confusing its record with Pershing Squares support for Targets management team? | ||
2. | Denying Fresh Perspectives: Target has publicly stated that it does not believe that any of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice would add value to the board. We note that the Nominees for Shareholder Choice are highly qualified and experienced and, if elected, they would bring senior operating experience that is directly relevant to Targets core businesses and assets, as well as corporate governance expertise and a shareholder perspective. | |
Why does Target think that the Nominees for Shareholder Choice would bring no value to the board? What is the downside of electing some or all of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice? |
3. | Circling the Wagons: As recently as January of this year, Target had 13 members on its board, but now the company is seeking a shareholder vote to determine that the size of the board is 12. | |
Why would Target rather shrink the board than let shareholders choose one of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice to join the board? | ||
4. | Cozy Relationships: The chair of Targets nominating committee, Stephen Sanger, serves as a director and a member of the compensation committee of the board of Wells Fargo & Co. Mr. Sanger received over $1.25 million in fees and equity-based compensation from Wells Fargo over the past five years. Targets nominating committee nominated Richard Kovacevich, an incumbent Target director and the Chair of the Wells Fargo board, for re-election at the upcoming annual meeting. | |
Did Mr. Sanger recuse himself from the consideration of Mr. Kovacevichs nomination in light this apparent conflict? | ||
5. | Corporate Governance Missing the Target: Target prides itself on having best-in-class governance principles. Incumbent nominee, Solomon Trujillo, the CEO of an Australian telecommunications company, has been on the Target board for 15 years. Some time after the companys 2006 annual meeting, Target changed its corporate governance guidelines to extend its board member term limit from 15 years to 20 years. Mr. Trujillo appears to be the only incumbent director to benefit from this degradation of Targets corporate governance principles. | |
Is the continued service of an Australian Telecom CEO worth compromising Targets governance principles? Is it in the best interest of shareholders to have the same director for 20 years? How does Mr. Trujillos expertise add more value to Target than that of any of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice who have deep expertise in retail, credit cards, real estate, shareholder value and corporate governance? | ||
6. | Rejecting Choice One Proxy Card for All Nominees: Ron Gilson, a leading corporate governance expert and one of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice, has urged the use of a universal proxy card and requested (twice) that Target and the incumbent nominees consent to be named on a single card, at Pershing Squares expense. Shareholders should be able to conveniently choose the best candidates from both slates without having to attend the Annual Meeting in person. Target rejected a universal proxy card and ignored repeated requests to name all nominees on a single proxy card. | |
Why is Targets board limiting shareholder choice? Why has Targets board ignored repeated requests to name all nominees on one proxy card? | ||
7. | Refusing Shareholder Board Representation: Pershing Square is the third largest beneficial owner of Target shares. Based on recent market prices, this stake includes approximately $1 billion in shares of common stock (3.3% of the company) and $280 million in stock options (4.5% of the company until these options are exercised, the stock underlying these options cannot be voted). Pershing Square is Targets fourth largest |
shareholder based on its common stock holdings alone. In contrast, Targets independent directors own less than 0.1% of the company in the aggregate. | ||
Why should a large, long-term shareholder be denied any representation on a board when the incumbent independent directors have little skin in the game? | ||
8. | Lack of Ownership Culture Fostered by Poor Governance: In the past five years prior to the day Pershing Square announced the candidacies of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice, Targets directors and executive management purchased approximately $4 million of shares, but sold shares worth approximately $429 million during the same period. | |
Why would the compensation plans approved by the Target board allow directors and executive management to sell $429 million of Target stock over a five-year period? | ||
9. | Failed Nominating Process: Target describes the selection of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice as hasty and last-minute. This allegation comes after Target refused to meet or interview two Nominees for Shareholder Choice Michael Ashner, a seasoned real estate investor and owner-manager, and Richard Vague, a former credit card industry CEO who successfully built and sold two highly successful credit card companies. | |
Why did the Target board refuse to appropriately consider Messrs. Ashner and Vague? Regardless of which process the board used to identify its nominees, how is it that the board concluded that only the incumbent nominees fit the bill? | ||
10. | Failed Assessment of Strategic Alternatives: When assessing strategic transactions for its credit card business, Targets board elected to retain the credit risks associated with the credit card business, despite repeated requests by Pershing Square to reduce credit and funding risk. We believe that as a result of this ill-advised decision, Targets credit card operating profits fell by 65% in 2008. In our view, this has been a major contributing factor to the 51% decline in Targets stock price from the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2007 to the date immediately prior to the announcement of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice for the upcoming election. | |
Why did the Target board wait until prodding by Pershing Square to mitigate funding risk in its credit card portfolio? Why did the board ignore Pershing Squares repeated requests to transfer credit risk to a partnering financial institution? Why should shareholders not hold incumbent nominee Mr. Kovacevich, the boards self-described credit card expert, accountable for this destruction of shareholder value? | ||
With respect to its real estate assets, Target owns over 200 million square feet of retail real estate and over 35 million square feet of distribution facilities, which we believe to be worth approximately $40 billion. Targets enterprise value is approximately $49 billion, implying that the retail business, excluding the value of the real estate and the credit card assets, is worth practically nothing. Clearly, that is not the case. Despite this stock market mispricing, the board has decided not to explore alternatives to unlock real estate value for shareholders. |
Why has the board refused to explore alternatives to unlock value in the companys real estate portfolio? | ||
11. | Lack of Focus: Another incumbent nominee, George Tamke, is a partner at the private investment firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, Inc. (CDR). Mr. Tamke is a director of three of CDRs portfolio companies and the chairman of two of these companies. Three other incumbent directors serve on the boards of major financial institutions that clearly need more time and focus, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo. | |
Does Mr. Tamke have sufficient time to devote to his service as a director of Target, which is also under strain in the current economic environment? Is Mr. Tamke better qualified than any of the Nominees for Shareholder Choice? Will the other incumbent directors dedicate as much or more time to Target as to their challenged financial institutions? |